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PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
NIGERIA
Lawrence Azubuiket
I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the seemingly successful outcome of the British experience
in privatizing otherwise state-owned enterprises (SOE) 1 in the 1980s,2 and

f L.L.B., Calabar, Nigeria; L.L.M., University of Georgia; Member of the New York bar;
Mr. Azubuike practices law in New York.
1. State-owned enterprises means business enterprises owned by government. See
Richard J. Zeckhauser & Murray Horn, The Control of State-Owned Enterprises, in PAUL
W. MACAVOY ET AL., PRIVATIZATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE: LESSONS FROM

THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND CANADA 7, 10 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
1989) (quoting Aharoni (1986 p.6) to the effect that SOEs have three distinguishing
characteristics: "First... they must be owned by the government. Second,... [they] must
be engaged in the production of goods and services for sale ... Third, sales revenues of
SOEs should bear some relationship to cost."). Although this is not a definition of art, it
does underline the requirement that an SOE must belong to the public, and must be, at the
bare minimum, aim to do business even if profit making is not the sole objective. The
Nigerian Bureau of Public Enterprises defines a "[SOE] as government-owned or
government controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from
selling goods or services. It may also include enterprises established to provide commercial
activities in which government controls management by virtue of its ownership stake. It
encompasses enterprises.., directly or indirectly through other federal and state
government entities." Bureau of Public Enterprises Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.bpeng.org/10/0317731656532b.asp?DocID=93&MenuID=34 (last visited Dec. 9,
2005).
2. See Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic Changes from Government Owned and
Managed Enterprises to Private Sector Enterprises:Micro-Economic Effects of Privatizing
Telecommunications Enterprises, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 313; see also Yair Aharoni, The United
Kingdom: Transforming Attitudes, in THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR
U.S. POLICY 23-56, (Raymond Vernon & Council on Foreign Relations eds., 1988); JOHN
VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 428-429 (MIT
Press 1988) (giving a favorable review of the British program but expressing reservation
about the privatization of monopolies); John Vickers & George Yarrow, Privatization in
Britain, in PAUL W. MACAVOY ET AL., PRIVATIZATION AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE:
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND CANADA 209, 209-245 (Kluwer

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 13:1

the collapse of communism, the world witnessed a reduction in direct state
involvement in economies. 3 There is now a de-emphasis on direct

government participation in enterprises.

What were once state-owned

companies are being transferred to private hands.4 In another sense,
privatization is part of the overall restructuring of the political and

economic lives of many nations; from communism to market economies,
from dictatorship to democracy, and, in the case of developing countries,
from neo-colonialism to an attempt at true independence.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. It has had its own
share of the oscillation between robust state participation in the economy
and capitalism. Its history is marked by political instability, as evidenced
by its attempts at civilian administration frequently interrupted by military
interventions. Consequently, Nigeria has witnessed the dilemma of the
tension between free enterprise and the nationalism notionally ensured by
a state-run economy. Nigeria desires foreign capital in the form of foreign
investments for its economy. This article analyzes Nigeria's effort to
resolve this dilemma by privatizing SOEs. It attempts an assessment of the
exercise, which in one sense is more than a decade old, and in another
sense is five years old. In particular, it examines the extent to which the
exercise has promoted, or is capable of promoting foreign investment.
Part II gives a brief background of Nigeria. Part III examines the meaning

Academic Publishers 1989); Gladstone Hutchinson, Efficiency Gains through Privatization
of U.K. Industries, in PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 87-107, (Attiat F. Ott & Keith
Hartley eds., 1991) (concluding from a study that public ownership in the U.K. led to
growth in labor productivity, while private ownership led to growth in profits); Ronald D.
Utt, Privatizationin the United States, in PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (Attiat F. Ott &
Keith Hartley eds., 1991) (asserting that the British experience is perhaps the best known
and most successful program of privatization where major divestitures occurred over an
extended period).
3. See Otive Igbuzor, Presentation of Paper Entitled "Privatization in Nigeria: Critical
Issues of Concern to Civil Society" at a Power Mapping Roundtable Discussion on the
Privatization Programme in Nigeria Organised by Socio-Economic Rights Initiative (SERI)
2 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.cdd.org.uk/pdflnigeria-privatisation.pdf (asserting
that "[t]oday, the received wisdom is that the state should recede.. . and that private
ownership of the means of production is the only viable approach to the efficient
production of goods and services, as well as economic growth and development.
Consequently, there is a move all over the world to privatize erstwhile public enterprises.").
4. See Keith Hartley and David Parker, Privatization:A Conceptual Framework, in
PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (Attiat F. Ott & Keith Hartley eds., 1991) (stating that
privatization has become a feature of many economies).
5. Id.
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of privatization and the arguments usually proffered in favor of and against
privatization. Part IV discusses the legal and institutional frameworks
under which privatization is carried out in Nigeria and the incentives,
which, together with the privatization exercise, are expected to attract
foreign investment, while Part V examines what impact the privatization
exercise has had or is capable of having on foreign investments in Nigeria.
II.

BRIEF HISTORY OF NIGERIA
6

Nigeria is made up of several tribes. It is comprised of more than two
hundred and fifty ethnic groups, although three of them are more
predominant.7 Geographically, it is situated in the western part of sub8
Saharan Africa, and has a total land area of 923,768 square kilometers.
With an estimated population of about 130 million, 9 Nigeria is the most
black populated country in the world. It is endowed with enormous
natural resources, of which oil accounts for ninety- five percent of the
country's foreign exchange. The agricultural sector was vibrant before oil
was discovered in the early 1970s.10 Politically, Nigeria was a colony of
Great Britain until it obtained independence in 1960.11 Since attaining
autonomy, it has not had a durable democratic government. Of the fortyfive years Nigeria has been independent, the military has tightly held the
reins of governance, having been in power for twenty-nine of those years.
Civilian officials have maintained control for only sixteen years, and are
currently in control. There appears to be a resolve to ensure that the
military never returns to control the government of Nigeria.

Book,
Fact
World
Agency
Intelligence
6. Central
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2005).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Briefs,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nigeria.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2005).
10. E. Wayne Nafziger, The Economy, in NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 155, 163 (Helen
Chapin Metz ed., U.S. Gov't Printing Office 5th ed. 1992). "The United Nations (UN)
Center for Development Planning, Projections, and Policies observed that Nigeria's real
growth in GDP between 1970 and 1974 was 12.3 percent per year. The annual target had
been only 6.2 percent. Nigerian growth could be explained by factors largely outside the
planners' purview-rapid oil industry growth and sharply increasing oil prices." Id.
11. Id. at 160.
12. The country recently concluded an election in 2003 in which the incumbent civilian
president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was re-elected for a second term. It is worthy of noting that
Mr. Obasanjo had first ruled the nation as a military head of state. He later won election as
a civilian in 1999.
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Classical economics recognizes three dominant models: capitalism,
socialism, and communism. For the most part, Nigeria has operated a
system that cannot be pigeonholed into any of these models. It is said to
have a mixed economy.13 Individual ownership and participation in the
economy have been on the rise. Most strategic sectors were initially run
and continue to be run by the government.1 4 A few private enterprises

were foreign-owned. This was, of course, a consequence of the colonial
experience. It has been asserted that during the 1960s and 1970s, SOEs
became the rule rather than the exception in sub-Saharan Africa." This
would appear to be a direct consequence of the nationalistic and

independent fervors that were prevalent in that part of the world at the
time.

16

Indeed, Nigeria's Second National Development Plan for 1970-

1975 called
for the state to assume the "commanding heights" of the
17
economy.
This plan was followed in 1972 by the government's
implementation of a nationalization program under which some foreignowned companies were indigenized. 18 Although the shares in the
nationalized enterprises were available to and acquired by the private
sector, the result of the exercise was the co-existence of state and private

13. Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Nigerian Public Policy on
Foreign Investment (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Golden Gate University) (on
file with Golden Gate University Library).
14. Government owned entities once exclusively operated the financial, manufacturing,
and communications sectors. See also GARY MOSER ET AL., NIGERIA: EXPERIENCE WITH
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 25 (International Monetary Fund 1997) ("State intervention in
major sectors of the economy spread throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Virtually all
the country's largest enterprises were wholly government owned ... [and] [p]ublic
enterprises posed a significant burden on the Federal Government's budget .... ).
15. ERNST & YOUNG, LLP,,PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994); see also Peter M. Lewis, State,
Economy, and Privatization in Nigeria, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR
REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 211 (Ezra N. Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., Westview
Press 1990) [hereinafter Privatization in Nigeria] (noting that throughout the 1950s and
1960s, the Nigerian Government's economic role was interventionist and tutelary, but
limited to the state acting as a "catalyst" for private sector development by creating the
physical, institutional, and financial environment for economic progress. This all changed
with the military intervention in 1966, and as a result the 1970s witnessed a strategy of de
facto state capitalism).
16. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15 at 34; see also Thomas M Callaghy & Ernest James
Wilson III, Africa: Policy, Reality, or Ritual?, in THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION: A
CHALLENGE FOR U.S. POLICY 183 (Raymond Vernon ed., Council on Foreign Relations
1988) (attributing the pronounced state involvement in enterprises to a fall out of the anticolonialist efforts which were in essence anti-capitalist and pro-socialist).
17. Privatizationin Nigeria,supra note 15, at 213.
18. See Nigerian Indigenization Decree 1972.
AROUND THE WORLD
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enterprises in the economy. If sub-Saharan African states embraced direct
state interference and participation in the economy, the embrace appeared
warmest in Nigeria. It is claimed that by 1990, the country possessed the
largest and one of the most troubled public enterprise sectors in subSaharan Africa.' 9
The boom of the 1970s, occasioned by the discovery of oil and the
resultant increase in the country's earnings, gave way to serious economic
problems and a decline in the overall economy starting in the early 1980s.
That decline has continued. In response, several administrations, both
civilian and military, have struggled with policies that would arrest the
decline, if not totally turn the economy around. The problems are
exacerbated, and some would say actually caused, by the unfortunate
malaise of corruption. 0 One of the measures that has been introduced is
the privatization exercise that theorizes the sale of government enterprises,
which have become drain pipes of the economy instead of boosting
government reserves, would spur the overall economy and in particular
promote foreign-investment. 21 Yet, it remains an open question whether
the government embarked on the privatization program after a careful and
constructive analysis of the country's economic situation. It might have
just been a knee-jerk reaction to what is undoubtedly a poor economic
outlook. Besides following the British experiment, privatization gained
worldwide attention, and countries facing harsh economic conditions have
joined the bandwagon.
III. PRIVATIZATION - MEANING AND JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Meaning

Privatization is essentially the withdrawal of the government from
active and direct participation in the affairs of an enterprise, which it
hitherto owned. 2 Privatization is at once an old and a new concept. On

19. Privatizationin Nigeria,supra note 15, at 210-233; Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16,
at 184.
20. Niyi Alabi, West Africa, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 215, 220 (Transparency
International 2003).
21. See MOSER ET AL., supra note 14, at 25 ("In 1986, 33 percent of the Federal
Government's domestically financed capital budget was allocated to investment in public
enterprises, and they absorbed an estimated 40 percent of the Federal Government's
nonsalary recurrent expenditure in the form of subsidies.").
22. See L. GRAY COWAN, PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 6 (Greenwood
Press 1990) (defining privatization as the transfer of a function, activity, or organization
from the public to the private sector); ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15, at 4 (also defining
privatization broadly "as the transfer or sale of any asset, organization, function, or activity
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one hand, the notion that business efficiency is best attained in private
hands has been around from time immemorial, and could be found in the
23
writings of Adam Smith as early as 1762 .
On the other hand, the
conscious adoption of privatization as part of state economic policy is
recent. It has been noted that the term first appeared in a dictionary only
in 1983. 24 Privatization is usually done in an effort to affect the economy in
a positive manner by removing structural obstacles inherent in the
ambiguous (if not self-contradictory) roles of the government in seeking to
provide services at the cheapest terms to the citizenry, while at the same
time hoping that an enterprise remains a going concern. Scholars identify
two aspects of the meaning of privatization. In one sense, it is said to be
''an array of actions designed to broaden the scope of private sector
activity, or the assimilation by the public sector of efficiency enhancing
techniques generally employed by the private sector. 2 ' This definition is

broad enough to include not only the government's divestment of its
interest in any or all enterprises, but also every conscious effort
undertaken by the government to reform its public sector and make it

more efficient. 26 In this way, privatization should be a constant in the

from

the public to the

private

sector."); PAUL COOK & COLIN KIRKPATRICK,
3-4 (St. Martin's Press 1988).
23. "In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown lands would produce a very
large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver
from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to
the crown ....When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the
course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated." VICKERS & YARROW,
supra note 2, at 1 (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)); see Also COWAN,
supra note 22 at 6; see also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15, at 4; see also Academy of
Political Science, Prospectsfor Privatization,36 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACAD. OF POLITICAL
SCI. No. 3 at 2 (Steve H. Hanke, ed., 1987) [hereinafter Academy of Political Science]
(asserting that Adam Smith tilled the ground for privatization).
24. COWAN, supra note 22, at 6; see also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15, at 4 (noting
that although privatization is old, it came to worldwide attention with the British
experiment in the 1980s); see also Academy of Political Science, supra note 23, at 2 (noting
that although the word, privatization, was not in the dictionary before 1983, its
counterpoint, nationalization, was already in the dictionary by then).
25. Mark Baker, Privatizationin the Developing World: Panaceafor the Economic Ills of
the Third World or Prescription Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233, 237
(1999) (quoting CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES
FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (James Currey 1992)). Ernst & Young see privatization
as a process and not an event, and note that it applies to all kinds of joint public-private
ventures. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15, at 4.
26. See also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15 (asserting that privatization is a process not
an event); Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16, at 180 (asserting that "[i]n its broader sense,
PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
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political economy of every state. This is because no state would admit that
it is not taking measures to make its public sector as efficient as possible.
The dispute has never been on the need for optimization of public
enterprises. Rather, it has always been on the best way to achieve that
result. The other sense in which privatization is understood is narrower. In
this context, it is viewed as the transfer from the public to the private
21
sector of ownership or control of productive assets or both. It would
seem that the narrower definition is more legal, while the broader
definition is more economic. Thus, the former focuses on the legal
consequence of privatization, whereas the latter captures its social and
economic benefits.
Privatization may also be done gradually or with a "big bang., 2
While a gradualist or intermediate approach to privatization effects a
phased divestment of the government's interest in enterprises, a "big
bang" or immediate privatization exercise seeks to transfer the
government's interest in an enterprise to the private sector as quickly as
29
possible. It is argued that a gradualist approach spreads the time within
which the pains of the exercise may be felt, and thereby reduces its
impact.30 On the other hand, proponents of immediate privatization posit
that the inherent disruption in services is felt once and for all. 3' Even if its
severity is pronounced, the populace would take solace in the fact that it is
for a short while. The line between the so-called "big bang" and
intermediate approaches may not be so sharp. It is inconceivable that a
government may wake up one morning and simply divest its holdings in

privatization is the introduction of greater market rationality or competitiveness into an
arena of economic activity.").
27. Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16, at 180; see also Stephanie R. Nicolas, Privatizing
South Africa's Industries The law and Economics of a New Socialist Utopia, 30 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 721, 721 (1999) (defining privatization "as the sale of a state-owned
business to entities other than the state."); Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an
International Phenomenon: Kazakhstan, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1399, 1404 (1999)
(quoting Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Soviet
Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 150 (1993) to the
effect that privatization is "the single act of transferring (by the means of buying and
selling) the legal title of State property, which was in the possession of State enterprises for
restricted purposes of producing certain goods under owner-State control, to individual or
associated owners."); Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16, at 180 (stating that "[n]arrowly
defined, privatization is any action that serves to dilute or eliminate government equity
ownership or managerial control of an enterprise.").
28. Nicolas, supra note 27, at 721-22; Mitrofanskaya, supra note 27, at 1404.
29. Nicolas, supra note 27, at 721.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 338.
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public enterprises. Usually, preparatory work is done. Moreover, because
of the vagaries and uncertainties associated with the exercise, most states
start out gradually on the privatization course.
B. Rationale
The privatization of SOEs is not usually an easy task. It is susceptible
to controversy. In many states, public enterprises are synonymous with the
government and oftentimes are avenues to reward political or other
patronage. Thus, a state intent on transferring ownership to the private
sector, has to contend with so many factors not least of which may be the
antagonism of the employees of the firms to be privatized." Yet, many
view privatization as a talisman for economic recovery.3 The western and
industrialized countries tout the benefits of a free market economy and of
privatization. To them, free market is to the economy what democracy is
to the polity.
First, and most importantly, it is argued that privatization leads to
efficiency,34 in the erstwhile SOEs.
The notion here is that the
performance of most SOEs is not measured on the basis of their
profitability. 5 Nor are the managers and other staff of the companies
necessarily answerable for losses sustained by such entities. Instead, the
continuity of their employment may be dependent on other factors, such as
party affiliation. Nigerian Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that the
staff of government owned enterprises cannot be terminated at will. They
can only lose their jobs for misconduct, and this can only be determined

32. See id. at 733-36.
33. Id. at 712.
34. Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank
Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 25-28 (1992) (asserting that privatization improves
the use of public resources and also improves operating and dynamic efficiencies); see also
Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words That Succeed and
Policies that Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (1995); John R. Dempsey,
Thailand's Privatization of State Owned Enterprises During the Economic Downturn, 31
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 373, 374 (2000) (asserting "that privatization is the best route to
the development of competitive industries, the deepening of domestic and international
capital supplies, and to continued economic growth in a world fixated on reducing
commercial barriers and promoting a free market."); Roger Barrett James, Information The Key to Fair Privatization: British Successes and Russian Pitfalls, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L
COMP. L.J. 837, 839-40 (1998) (stating that "[a]mong the most widely espoused reasons are
to create an enterprise culture, increase competition, reduce government involvement in
industry decision-making, eliminate waste, minimize state dependency, and increase and
improve the quality of goods and services.").
35. Nicolas, supra note 27, at 724.
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after a rigorous procedure.36 Such employees are said to enjoy a status
with statutory flavor.37 On the other hand, the private sector is profitdriven. Performance is based on output and profit. Directors constantly
are aware of the bottom line and of the need to achieve results. In
consequence, it is thought that when the ownership of a SOE is transferred
to the private sector, it will be infused with the efficiency that is believed to

be standard in the private sector. 38
One of the consequences of privatization is usually the removal of
government subsidies. 39 Such subsidies take different shapes. They may

be in the nature of guaranteed patronage by individuals or other persons
over whom the government may have leverage. Such persons, in a sense,
are forced to patronize the SOEs notwithstanding the standard of their
goods or services.
The subsidies may also be in the form of grants'and
• 40
subventions. With privatization, the SOEs will have to compete with
other firms and entities in the economy, without any subsidies from the
government.
Secondly, privatization is said to free the government to do what it is
best suited, which are regulation and the provision of security and other
fundamental services encapsulated in its police powers. 41 Perhaps, this
rationale can best be understood on two levels. Since government is
inherently not best suited to run profitable businesses, its direct
involvement distracts attention from its other functions. By pulling out of
direct involvement in the running of corporations, it can concentrate on its
core functions. An analogy to the basic economic concept of specialization
is apposite. Privatization results in the government deploying all its
resources to the fundamentals of running the country, and this will lead to
optimum performance in that area, while the private sector engages in
36. E.g., Fed. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Laoye, [19891 202 N.S.C.C. 87 (Nigeria); Garba v.
Univ. of Maiduguri [1986] 1 N.W.L.R. 550 (Nigeria); Olaniyan v. Univ. of Lagos, [19851 2
N.W.L.R. 599 (Nigeria).
37. Id.
38. Nicolas, supra note 27, at 724.
39. See Dempsey, supra note 34, at 379.
40. In Nigeria for instance SOEs sometimes receive subvention from the government to
pay staff salaries and to meet other recurrent expenses. See Edward Bewayo, Presentation
of Paper Entitled "Will Entrepreneurship Lead to National Development in Africa?" to the
1999 Small Business Institute Director's Association (Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/sbida/1999/31.pdf.
41. This is one of the reasons which the Nigerian government gave for embarking on the
privatization exercise. Olusegun Obasanijo, President of Nigeria, Inauguration of the
National
Council
on
Privatization
(July
29,
1999),
available
at
http://www.nopa.net/UsefulInformation/Presidential-Speeches/29july99.html [hereinafter
Presidential Statement].
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directly providing goods and services. This may be a variation on the
theme of efficiency. On another level, the government is the regulator of
the economy. In performing its refereeing role, the government is
supposed to be impartial and fair. If at the same time it is regulating the
conduct of market players, the government
is also a market participant,
•42
there is an inherent conflict of interest. This may lead to distortions in
the economy and again militate against efficiency. Privatization removes
this structural imbalance in the economy.
In the era of globalization, privatization is also seen as being
beneficial to a state's economy because it attracts foreign capital in terms
of foreign investment. Practically, since the SOEs are for sale, they
constitute another avenue for foreign investment. This is mostly the case
in developing countries where the enterprises may be gigantic and the
purchase price may not be readily available locally. However, while
privatization may make SOEs available to foreign investors and therefore
increase the avenues for capital inflow into the country, privatization alone
may not promote foreign investment.43 Outside investors are usually
aware of the political, social, and other dimensions of these enterprises.
Such circumstances may make foreign investors wary of committing their
resources to these ventures. Sometimes, in order to do so, they would seek
many assurances and other guarantees from the government. The extent
to which this rationale is carried out by the Nigerian exercise will
constitute a substantial theme of Part V of this article. Furthermore,
privatization may be embarked upon in order to raise funds for other
important social services. The logic is that since the enterprises are not
performing, the government may sell them off and apply the proceeds to
other pressing public needs. There are other reasons for which a state may
choose to privatize its public enterprises." These may vary with the

42. This is not just a theoretical possibility. There are claims that some SOEs may violate
regulations and go free. See Shirley, supra note 34, at 26 (giving the example of one African
country in which the SOEs were several years behind in paying their taxes and their utility
bills but were not sanctioned).
43. This is one of the stated objectives of the Nigerian exercise. See NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON PRIVATISATION (NIGERA), PRIVATISATION HANDBOOK art. 1(2) (Bureau of Public
Enterprises , 3rd ed. 2000) (stating that the government intends to use the privatization
program to reintegrate Nigeria into the global economy, as a platform to attract foreign
direct investment in an open, fair and transparent manner.).
44. For instance, some cynics believe that in some cases a state may privatize its state
ownership of commercial enterprises just because the level of failure on the part of the
enterprises is such that they imperil the position of the state officials. See Mitrofanskaya,
supra note 27, at 1403. In that sense the privatization is prompted by the self-interest of
such officials. See also Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16, at 183 (attributing the momentum
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particular state, but the overarching consideration is usually the attempt to
attain economic efficiency.
The concept of privatization is not a wholly-sweet pill to swallow. It
has its critics, who charge that privatization results in the increase in prices
and hurts the common man. This is the direct antithesis of the advantage
of efficiency and market forces. Since the SOEs are not profit driven, they
may charge significantly lower prices for their goods or services. Indeed,
the subsidies from the government are indirectly passed to the citizens, in
the nature of low prices. With privatization, and the need to compete on
equal terms with other participants in the market, the enterprises tend to
increase prices. However, proponents of privatization would counter that
while the cost of the products may increase, there is a corresponding
increase in the quality and standard of services obtained.
Closely related to this are the redundancies and loss of jobs that seem
to follow privatization. In a bid to achieve efficiency, the privatized
enterprises may want to streamline operations. This results in the loss of
jobs. The projected positive impact on the overall economy is not
immediate, and such aspiration may not seem a sufficient counterpoint to
the devastating effect the loss of jobs may have on individuals. No wonder
that in most developing economies, the stiffest resistance to privatization
comes from the labor unions and other workers' groups. 46 In some cases,

of the privatization exercise in Africa partly to the fact that African governments ran out of
cash).
45. But sometimes the touted objectives may conflict. And scholars may disagree on the
hierarchy of these rationales. Compare VICKERS & YARROw, supra note 2, at 425 (arguing
that the primary criterion for judging privatization is the improvement of industrial
efficiency and that other goals such as "extending share ownership, raising revenue, and so
on" are secondary; they assert that the latter goals can be achieved by other means), with
Leroy P. Jones et al., Net Benefits from Privatization of Public Enterprises, in
PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED

AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 53-70 (Attiat F. Ott & Keith Hartley eds., 1991) (alluding to
"the most standard measure of performance" of privatization, as being social welfare; they
assume that governments privatize in order to maximize social welfare, and that to assess
the success of privatization is to examine the effect of the divestiture on social welfare); of
course the dichotomy between the two reasons is not that sharp. The one inevitably leads
to the other. Economic efficiency invariably results in the greatest benefit to the greatest
number of individuals, that optimal and utopian state which is not antithetic of social
welfare. However, as with every controversial subject, perceptions may differ. The
rationales may also vary depending on the stakeholder concerned. This may range from
national and local governments, managers of the SOE to employees. See ERNST & YOUNG,
supra note 15, at 13-14.
46. For example, the Privatization agency in Nigeria has been having a running battle
with the workers of the state owned electricity enterprise, National Electric Power
Authority (NEPA). The workers strongly oppose privatization of NEPA.

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 13:1

the government has to take this factor into account, and may obtain a
guarantee from the prospective transferees of its interest that there would
not be a lay off of workers.
Similarly, it is contended that privatization exposes the economy to
dominance by a few. Only a few rich are in a position to acquire the SOEs.
This problem is compounded by the fact that in most developing countries
SOEs are monopolies. While the government owned them, political
pressures generally would insulate the consumers from the predatory
tendencies of the monopolies. But when they are transferred into the
private hands of a few rich folks who can afford them, they would exploit
and indeed abuse their market dominance. 47 This will undercut the social
and macroeconomic objectives for privatization, because "privately
efficient profit seeking can no longer be expected to lead to socially
efficient results. ' ' 48 In a region, such as Africa, reeling from the effects of
colonialism, this concern is elevated and may be at the heart of opposition
to privatization. Some might see the clamor for liberalization as another
mechanism to re-colonize the region of Africa using privatization as the
Trojan horse. 49 The panaceas for this shortcoming are few. First, states
may take measures to reduce the market power of the privatized
enterprise by expanding the scope of competition. This may be achieved
by eliminating any barriers to entry into the relevant market so as to
increase the scope of actual or potential competition.0 Secondly, the
enterprise may be restructured so as to eliminate or reduce its market
dominance." Where monopoly power remains as of necessity, the state
has to enact effective competition laws and other regulations: One caveat
is that a cautious balance must be maintained between appropriate
regulation and over regulation since the latter may defeat the purpose for
the privatization." Ideally, both reduction of market power and regulation

47. Thus Vickers and Yarrow argue that "[t]heoretical analysis and empirical evidence
support the view that private ownership is most efficient-and hence privatization is most
suitable - in markets where effective (actual or potential) competition prevails." See
VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 2, at 426.
48. Id.
49. Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 16, at 183.
50. Id. at 427.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Leroy P. Jones et al., Net Benefits from Privatization of Public Enterprises, in
PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED

supra note 2, at 45 (noting that government should
safeguard against price increase by regulating the enterprise after the privatization, but that
such regulation should be done carefully in order to maintain a balance between the need
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
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should precede the privatization. However, experience shows that most
developing states at best enact regulatory laws, if they do so at all, only as
part of the privatization exercise. Parts IV and V will emphasize that this
is one of the pitfalls of the privatization program in Nigeria.

This imbalance is more pronounced in developing states, and Amy
Chua, a scholar,54 has argued that writers on the subject tend to ignore this
tension. Simply put, privatization and "marketization" of the economy
would benefit the economically dominant few. It would further entrench

their dominance and cause a tension between democracy, as represented
by the majority, and market, which is dominated by the rich minority.
Chua asserts:
In developing countries with a market-dominant minority,
markets and democracy will tend to favor different ethnic
groups. Markets will (by definition) benefit the marketdominant minority, while democracy will increase the power
of the relatively impoverished majority.
In these
circumstances, markets and democracy will not be mutually
reinforcing. Rather, the combined pursuit of markets and
democracy will produce a very charged and unstable
situation.55
Chua's thesis assumes a powerful ethnic minority, but the thrust of the
proposition is equally true even where the minority is not a recognized
ethnic group. As long as the economic power resides in the hands of a few,

to protect against price increase and the need for the enterprise to achieve the objective for
its privatization in terms of cost constraint and productivity improvements).
54. "Most developing countries have one or more ethnic minorities who, for widely
varying reasons, have economically dominated the "indigenous" majorities around them.
Under certain conditions, the presence of an economically dominant minority will
introduce a fundamental tension between markets and democracy. This will be the case
whenever the economically dominant minority is also market-dominant, meaning that it
tends to be economically dominant under market conditions." Amy L. Chua, Markets,
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigmfor Law and Development, 108 YALE
L.J. 1, 7 (1998). Of course it is arguable whether such tension is wholly undesirable. To the
extent that the market dominant group is in the political minority, that scenario will offer
an inherent protection to the consumers, which will invariably be in the political majority.
Furthermore, in the peculiar context of developing or undeveloped democracies, the
dilemma may be theoretical because political power may tend to track economic power. In
other words, those who control economic power, even if they are in the minority, still
possess political power. Although this is antithetic of democracy, developing countries
especially in Africa have not witnessed true democracy.
55. Id.
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they will tend to coalesce into an association that may be likened- to an
ethnic group. This triggers a tension where they are in a position to
virtually buy all SOEs. Part IV will show that this concern is not lost on
the architects of the privatization exercise in Nigeria.
Privatization also results in the loss of a sense of symbolic ownership
of the SOEs. Notionally, since the enterprises are owned by the state, they
belong to everyone. They are the common heritage of the entire citizenry.
Therefore, upon sale, it is not only the government that is divested, but
also the common man. And critics may not be persuaded by the fact that
the sale of the enterprises will be for valuable consideration, which will go
to the common purse. They see the physical structure of the SOE as a sign
of their common ownership. The money realized from the sale may not be
so visible to them, and indeed, it may be doubtful if it would be applied for
their common good. Besides, in a system that is not particularly
transparent, the valuation and pricing of the enterprises may be tainted or,
indeed, dubious.
IV.

PRIVATIZATION OF STATE INTERESTS IN ENTERPRISES IN
NIGERIA

The objectives of the Nigerian government in undertaking the
privatization of its SOEs are not different from the overall rationale, which
inform the process in most places. 56 According to the government,

[i]t is estimated that successive Nigerian Governments have
invested up to 800 billion naira in public-owned enterprises.
Annual returns on this huge investment have been well
below 10 per cent. These inefficiencies and, in many cases

huge losses, are charged against the public treasury.57
In the same vein, the government claims that millions of dollars are lost
due to inefficiencies in the generation and distribution of power and fuel,

56. See Presidential Statement, supra note 41.
57. Id. A similar sentiment informed the first privatization program in 1986. See M. T
OKORODUDU-FUBARA,
A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF THE PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES 13 (Adepegba Printing Press 1988) (referring to a statement by the Secretary
to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to the effect that while government had
invested 8 billion naira in equity shares and 15 billion naira in loans, its returns had been
lower than 400 million naira to 800 million naira). Some argue that privatization is a
natural corollary of the two prior economic policies of nationalization and indigenization,
which the Nigerian government had pursued. These policies saddled the government with
multiple economic and social undertakings. See id. at 7-14.
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two critical areas in which the state is still the primary and dominant

operator. 58 Nigeria's approach has been gradual. The government denies
that it is embarking on an exercise to please the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund, 59 although few believe that those bodies will
not be pleased at such reform. Furthermore, in an allusion to the tension
to which this article adverted in the preceding part, this assures that the
program "isnot designed to share our national assets to a few rich
people." 6 Nor was the country about to replace public monopolies with
private ones.6" On the anticipated nexus between the privatization exercise
and foreign investment, the President argued that privatization would
bring in foreign technology, managerial competence, and capital, while at
the same time ensuring
functioning of utilities, which also
•
• the proper
62
would attract foreign investments.
A. The Legal Framework
The military administration made the first attempt at privatization in
1988 via decree. 6' The scheme enunciated by the 1988 decree was the
categorization of enterprises into four groups: those to be partially
privatized; fully privatized; partially commercialized; and fully

58. OKORODUDU-FUBARA, supra note 57, at 7-14.
59. Id. Compare Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Privatization in Africa, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 246 (Ezra N.
Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., Westview Press 1990) (contending that much of the
current interest in privatization in Africa can be traced to the demands of foreign actors
that third world countries rationalize their public sectors.), and LEWIS, supra note 15, at 210
(attributing the first privatization exercise of the Babangida administration to economic
crisis, while noting that "[d]istributive pressures dominate Nigerian politics, and political
imperatives hold sway over the nation's economy" and that these do militate against the
privatization exercise). The truth appears to be that whilst the governments would relish
the enormous leverage the SOEs give them over the polity, the reality of the nigh collapse
of the economy stares them squarely in the face. Between the demise of those institutions
and the injection of a measure of efficiency, the government will reluctantly choose the
latter. Thus the impetus, which the exercise seems to garner, is a result of several factors.
60. Olusegun Obasanijo, President of Nigeria, Inauguration of the National Council on
Privatization
(July
20,
1999),
available
at
http://www.nopa.net/UsefulInformationlprivatization/imperative.htm.
61. Id. A significant step in this direction is the proposal to split the power giant, NEPA,
into several smaller entities prior to its privatization. Another may be the effort to enact an
antitrust regime.
62. Id.
63. Privatisation and Commercialisation Act, (1990) Cap. 369, (Nigeria).
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commercialized.6
Partial privatization under the decree implied the
divestment of only part of governmental holding in the affected enterprise.
Full privatization entailed the divestiture of all the proprietary interest
65
held by the government in the affected firm.
Similarly, full
commercialization meant the reorganization of the enterprises with the
result that they operate as profit making ventures and without subvention
of any kind from the government. 66 For partially commercialized entities,
the government was to still fund capital projects but not recurrent ones.
As with most decrees promulgated by the military administrations, the
1988 decree was brief and contained scant substantive provisions. 6' The
only other substantive part of that decree was the provision establishing a
Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC),
with responsibilities for advising on the capital restructuring needs of
enterprises under the purview of the decree, and generally implementing
the provisions of the decree.
The currently operative legislation, which provides the legal
framework for privatization, is the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and
Commercialisation) Act of 199969 (hereinafter Privatisation and
Commercialisation Act or the Act).
The Act enacts a gradualist
approach70 to privatization. In doing so, it follows the 1988 model of

64. See Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25, (1988) § § 1 & 12 (Nigeria).
(The former dealt with partial and full privatization while the latter dealt with partial and
full commercialization.).
65. By the provision of § 14 of the Decree the word "enterprises" was given an
expansive connotation to mean: "any corporation, board, company or parastatal established
by or under any enactment in which the Federal Military Government, or any of its
Departments, Ministries, or agencies has ownership or equity interest and shall include a
partnership, joint venture or any other form of business arrangement or organisation."
66. See Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25, (1988) § 14 (Nigeria).
67. Decree No. 25 contained 14 sections divided into three parts.
68. See Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25, (1988) § § 3 & 4 (Nigeria).
69. There was also the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree 1993 but this was repealed
by the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act. See Public Enterprises (Privatisation and
Commercialization) Decree No. 28, (1999) A1121 (Nigeria).
70. It is gradualist or intermediate if you take the entire exercise as a whole, otherwise it
is arguable that for the enterprises to be fully privatized the approach is immediate or the
so-called big bang.

2005]

PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

75

71
fully privatized;72
placing SOEs into four categories: partially privatized;
7
7
partially commercialized; ' and fully commercialized. 1
According to the tenor of the Act, partial privatization means that the
government does not fully divest its interest in the concerned SOE.
Instead, it introduces a scheme whereby 51% of the shares in such an
enterprise are sold to what is known as the "core" or "strategic" investor.
The government retains 29% 71 of the equity, while 20% is available for
subscription by Nigerian individuals.
Out of the 20% available to
individuals, 10%76 (i.e. half) will be allotted to the staff of the affected
enterprise. The concept of "core investor" indirectly appeals to foreign
investors. An investor "must not only possess the technical know-how in
relation to the activities of the enterprise they wish to invest in but also
possess the financial capacity to pay competitive price for the enterprise
and increase their capital base. 7 8 Given the paucity of both resources

Id. at Part I.
71. Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialization) Decree No. 28, (1999)
A1121 § 1(1) (Nigeria).
72. Id. at § 1(2).
73. Id. at § 6(1).
74. Id. at § 6(2).
75. The distribution was formerly 40% to core investor and 40% to the government.
The National Council on Privatisation (NCP) amended schedule.
76. Section 5(3) of the Act; Originally this was one per cent, but pursuant to powers
which the Act has vested in it the NCP increased it to 10%.
77. This appears to be an attempt to woo employees and to reduce their opposition to
the exercise.
78. Presidential Statement, supra note 41. Section 34 of the Act defines "strategic
investor". Privatisation and Commercialisation Act, supra note 63, § 34. The Guidelines on
Privatisation issued by the NCP has the following provisions on core investors:
"13.1 Core Investors or Strategic Investors can be described as formidable and experienced
groups with the capabilities for adding value to an enterprise and making it operate
profitably in the face of international competition. They should possess the capabilities of
turning around the fortune of such an enterprise, if by the time of their investment, the
enterprise is unhealthy. The major characteristics that distinguish strategic/core group
investors are:
(a) They must posses the technical know-how in relation to the activities of the enterprises
they wish to invest in. For example, a Core Investor into Cement Company must have
access to cement production expertise with regards to optimal use of the machinery,
maintenance of such machinery and other technical aspects of Cement Production such as
procurement of raw materials, etc.
(b) The Core Investors must also posses the financial muscle, not only to pay competitive
price for the enterprise they wish to buy into but also to turn around its fortune, using their
own resources without relying on the Government for funds. Each Core/Strategic Investor
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locally, the dual requirements would work in favor of foreign investors.

This is consistent with the general intendment of the exercise to attract
foreign investments. It is also pertinent to mention that the sale of the
shares available to Nigerians shall be done on the basis of equality of
Federal Constituencies.7 9
When there is an over-subscription, "no
individual subscriber shall be entitled to hold more than 0.1 per cent equity
shares in the ... enterprise. ' 8° Significantly, the critical enterprises, such as

the

National

Electric

Power

Authority

(NEPA)

and

Nigerian

Telecommunications
partally "
"
81 Limited (Nitel), are in the list of entities to be
partially privatized.
This reflects the ambivalence with which many
peopleembr
still view
The government has yet to wholeheartedly
ce
•
•privatization.
.
82

embrace privatization.
It is questionable whether this approach is
beneficial or not. On one hand, considering the strategic nature of these
enterprises, there may be need for the government to retain some form of
interest in them. However, experience has shown once the government is
is expected to prepare a Short/Medium/Long term plan for the development of the
enterprise and indicate how it will be financed.
(c) The Core Investor must have the management know-how to run a business profitably in
a competitive environment where market forces dictate the business environment.
13.2 Given the magnitude of investment level in the utilities earmarked for privatisation,
the lack of absorptive capacity of the Nigerian Capital Market, our low technological level
among other reasons, it is quite obvious that there is need to utilise the services of core
investors in the new dispensation.
13.3 In consonance with S(4) of the Privatisation Act, privatised enterprise which requires
participation by Strategic Investors may be managed by the Strategic Investors as from the
effective date of privatisation on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon.
National Council on Privatization, supra note 43, at Article 11. On the other hand,
strategic investors will work hand in hand with the existing Management for a certain
transition
period."
Guidelines
on
Privatisation
and
Commercialisation,
http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/guide-priv.shtml (last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
79. Privatisation and Commercialization Act, supra note 63, at § 5.2. This result is
consequent on the amendment effected by the NCP. Originally the emphasis was on
equality of States. Id.
80. Privatisation and Commercialization Act, supra note 63, at § 5.4. It is arguable
whether this is an adequate safeguard against monopoly.
Amakon Uzochukwu,
PrivatisationModels: A Comparative Experience, in READINGS ON PRIVATISATION 36, 36
(Eze Onyekpere LL.B (Hons.) B.L. ed., 2003).
81. Kevin Egerue, PrivatiseNitel, PHCN Fast, DAILY CHAMPION (Lagos), Aug. 29, 2005
(on file with author).
82. Herbst attributes the ambivalence to the political roles SOEs play in Africa. As a
result, he argues, governments would not wholeheartedly commit to privatization. He thus
suggests a more realistic and lasting solution that would involve incremental reforms to
improve public sector operations along with selected divestment. See HERBST, supra note
59, at 234-251. Indeed the control of these huge SOEs is seen as one of the attractions of
governance and many politicians factor them in their political calculations.
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involved, it may call the shots irrespective of the amount of its
shareholding.83 As a result, such an arrangement may not augur well for
attracting the much needed foreign capital. Foreign investors usually are
particular about stability and some form of certainty. They are aware of
the legal, political, and other constraints in redressing governmental
intermeddling in enterprises.8 It is suspected that this incongruence made
the National Council on Privatisation8 1 (NCP) amend the ratio of the
percentage of ownership in partially privatized SOEs, from 40:40 to 51:29,
in favor of core investors. It is doubtful if such an enhanced and clear
majority provides a sufficient assurance that the government will allow the
core investors the required free hand to turn the ailing, partially-privatized
enterprises around.
Full privatization entails the divestment of the entirety of the
government's shareholding in the enterprise. 86 In most of the companies
involved, the government is only part holder of the stocks. Thus, in this
case, privatization is the transfer to the private sector of the government's
already limited interest in the companies.8 The firms in this category,
including companies in the oil industry such as Unipetrol PLC, National
Oil and Chemical Company PLC, and African Petroleum PLC, are not as
strategic as those for partial privatization. As in the partially privatized
companies, the shares available for sale are to be allocated on an equitable
geographical spread using the equality of Federal Constituencies as a basis,
and "[n]ot less than 1 per cent of the shares" are to be made available to
employees of the enterprises.
As we saw earlier, privatization, in the broad sense, encapsulates
commercialization. This is because, in its wide connotation, privatization

83. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 15, at 111 (alluding to the unwillingness or inability of
government to relinquish control completely, but noting that private investors and
governments usually make uncomfortable bed partners). In the past government has been
known to appoint and remove directors of companies in which it had an interest without
reference to constitutive documents of such companies. Id.
84. Dr. Aboubacar Fall, Issues Relating to Capital Flows in Africa: The African
Development Bank Perspective 4 (March 2003) (unpublished report , on file with
UNITAR),
available
at
http://www.unitar.org/dfm/AssessmentReport2003/Luanda/Unpublished/Capital-Flows-Af
rica.pdf.
85. Privatisation and Commercialization Act, supra note 63, §9.1. The NPC is a body
created under the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act. Id.
86. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON PRIVATISATION, supra note 43, at 54.
87. Otive Igbuzor, Privatisationin Nigeria: CriticalIssues of Concern to Civil Society, in
READINGS ON PRIVATISATION 36,36 (Eze Onyekpere LL.B (Hons.) B.L. ed., 2003).
88. Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialization) Decree No. 28, (1999)
A1121 § § 5(2)-5(3) (Nigeria).
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encompasses every attempt by the state to make the SOEs operate with
the same level of efficiency as obtained in the private sector. This is at the
heart of the Nigerian approach to commercialization. For firms to be
partially commercialized, the implication is that "such enterprises so
designated will be expected to generate enough revenue to cover their
operating expenditures. The government may consider giving them capital
grants to finance their capital projects. ' '89 On the other hand, full
commercialization "[m]eans that enterprises so designated will be expected
to operate profitably on a commercial basis and be able to raise funds from
the capital market without government guarantee. Such enterprises are
expected to use private sector procedures in the running of their
businesses. ' 9°
The strict or narrow interpretation of privatization may exclude both
forms of commercialization, because the legal ownership of the
enterprises, or equities therein, remains vested in the government.
However, commercialization effects the removal of the subsidies they
hitherto enjoyed from the government. These enterprises are therefore
not available for foreign direct investment. But the bulk of the enterprises
in both categories provide social and other important services 91 to the
economy. And to the extent that they operate at their optimum, they
definitely would contribute to an environment that is very attractive to
foreign investors.
The Act creates an ad-hoc body known as the Public Enterprises
Arbitration Panel, which is responsible for effecting prompt settlement of
any dispute between an enterprise and the National Council on
Privatization (NCP or "the Council") or the Bureau of Public Enterprises
(BPE or "the Bureau"). 92 This is by virtue of Section 28, which provides:
(1) The Panel shall have power to arbitrate (a) in any dispute raising questions as to the interpretation
of any of the provisions of a Performance Agreement; or
(b) in any dispute on the performance or non-performance
by any enterprise of its undertakings under a Performance
Agreement.

89. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON PRIVATISATION, supra note 43, at 54.

90. Id.
91. Example the parks, the Railways Nigerian Television Authority, Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation, etc.
92. Privatisation and Commercialization Act, supra note 63, at § 27(1).
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(2) A dispute on the performance or non-performance by
any of the parties to the Performance Agreement shall, in
the case of a commercialised enterprise, lie to that Panel
providing that such reference may be made after all
reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute have been made
and have not been proved.
(3) The ruling of the Panel shall be binding on the parties
and no appeal shall lie from a decision of the Panel to any
court of law or tribunal.93
It is not exactly clear why the jurisdiction of the Public Enterprises
Arbitration panel is so narrowly defined. It may be presumed that
"enterprise" as used in Section 28 of the Act refers to an enterprise, which
is the subject of privatization. The underlying premise of privatization is
that the government wants to sell all or part of its interest in such
enterprise or, in the case of commercialization, to stop subsidizing it. The
NCP and the BPE are both creatures of the government through a law. Is
it contemplated that the Council or the Bureau should enter into
negotiations with the enterprises? If the Council or the Bureau correctly
interprets its powers and functions under the Act, can an enterprise legally
impede the exercise of those powers or functions? It would seem that any
dispute that may arise between the Council or the Bureau and an
enterprise would ipso facto implicate the interpretation of the Act.
Curiously, the Panel is not given power to interpret the Act. It would
seem that the contemplated disputes 94 may relate to sale of government's
interest and may involve core investors or other persons interested in
acquiring the shares of an enterprise. If so, Section 28 is unclear because a
prospective investor cannot be referred to as an "enterprise," within the
meaning of section 28. This is a lacuna, which may militate against foreign
investments. Most prospective investors try to familiarize themselves with
the dispute settlement mechanisms in the countries of their interest. If
Section 28 was meant to signal a quick and fair dispute settlement
mechanism, it does a poor job of it, and if it does not, that is an avoidable
omission.

93. Id. at § 28.
94. Section 28's reference to Performance Agreement suggests that the "enterprise"
referred to is the enterprise after privatization or commercialization. This also leaves out
the question of a dispute relating between an investor and the Council or Bureau relating to
the sale of government's interest.
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B. InstitutionalFramework
The Privatisation and Commercialisation Act creates two bodies
directly charged with implementing the privatization program. The first is
the NCP,95 which is composed of persons holding certain important
portfolios in the government and others appointed by the President. Its
functions are generally policy related and supervisory. 96 It determines the
broad guidelines for effectuating the privatization program. The second
body is the BPE or Bureau, 97 which is headed by a person, designated
Director General. 98 The Bureau's functions are essentially to execute the
policies set by the NCP and to provide secretarial support to the NCP.
Both bodies are to work in tandem to ensure that all aspects of the
privatization program are carried out effectively and properly.
For all intents and purposes, the BPE is like an agent of the NCP,
albeit a statutorily appointed one. This is because the BPE carries out the
decisions of the NCP, although the former may make recommendations to
the latter. Yet, in a curious departure from established drafting tradition
in the country, the Bureau is statutorily made a body corporate and
invested with perpetual succession.99
What makes this provision even more significant is that the Act is
silent on whether the NCP has similar attributes. The anomaly is that the
principal may not ordinarily' °° be amenable to lawsuits at the same time as
the agent. An overly ambitious Director General of the Bureau may also
exploit this apparent oversight to flout the directives of the NCP. The
availability of the Bureau as the clearinghouse, and with authority to bind
the government on issues of privatization is salutary. It provides the one
stop shop for the foreign investor interested in the privatization program."'
C. Foreign Investment Incentives in Nigeria
Foreign investment is broadly defined as "the institutional, individual,
or governmental acquisition of assets in a foreign country. It includes both
direct investment and portfolio investment and encompasses both public

95. Privatisation and Commercialization Act, supra note 63, at Part II Section 9(1).
96. Id. at § 11.
97. Id. at § 12.
98. Id. at § 17.
99. Id. at § 12(2).
100. It is arguable that the Provisions relating the Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel
enable NCP to bring, and to be subject to, proceedings in that panel.
101. However, under the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995 every
enterprise in which a foreigner has an interest has to register with the Commission.
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authorities and private firms."'01 2 There is a tendency to distinguish this
broad understanding from the narrower context of foreign direct
investment, which some see as "'any investment in another country which
is carried out by private companies or individuals as opposed to
government aid.' 103
Different countries may define foreign direct
investment differently. The internationally accepted standard definitions
of foreign direct investment are rather technical, and are contained in the
Balance of Payments Manual' ° and the Detailed Benchmark Definition of
Foreign Direct Investment. 05 According to the former, foreign direct
investment refers to investment made to acquire lasting interest in
enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor.'0 The
foreign entity or group of entities that make the investment is called the
"direct investor," while the unincorporated or incorporated enterprise in
which the direct investment is made is referred to as a "direct investment
enterprise. "'0' The direct investor's purpose is to gain an effective voice in
the management of the enterprise. The Balance of Payments Manual and
the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment suggest
a threshold of 10% equity ownership as the stake significant or sufficient
to give effective voice in the management. 108 The BD3 of the OECD
would exclude any 10% ownership if it can be proven that it does not allow
the investor an effective voice in the management of the direct investment
enterprise. Similarly, it would include a holding of less than 10%
ownership if the direct investor nonetheless maintains effective voice in
the management. 1°9 It is pertinent to note that effective voice in the
management of the direct investment enterprise is not tantamount to
control of the enterprise. Of course, it is doubtful if ownership of 10%
102. Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Nigerian Public Policy on
Foreign Investment 10 (1988) (Ph.d dissertation Golden Gate University) (on file with the
Golden Gate University Library).
103. Id. at 10 (quoting DAVID W. PEARCE, MACMILLAN DICrIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS 159 (London: Macmillan 1986).

104. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (International Monetary Fund, 5' Ed., 1993),
availableat http://www.imf org/external/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf(last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
105. OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (Organization for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development,
Ed.,
1996), available at
3 RD
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf(last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
106. See, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Glossary - Foreign
Direct
Investment
(FDI),
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemlD=3164&lang=l (last visited Dec. 9,
2005) [hereinafter World Investment Directory].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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interest in an enterprise is sufficient to vest control of the firm, unless the
other 90% is totally diluted in terms of lack of homogeneity or cohesion
among its holders. The test is the ability to have a voice. In most cases,
possession of 10% ownership would constitute the holder into a block that
cannot be easily ignored. Ownership of the requisite interest may be in the
nature of equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings, and the provision of
intra-company loans.1 However, portfolio investment is not thought to
entail any interest in the management of the enterprise, and is therefore
considered to fall outside the purview of foreign direct investment.
Generally, Nigeria is a member of most of the multilateral trading and
financial institutions of the world."' It makes a deliberate effort to attract
foreign investors. 113 As a result, concomitant with the privatization
exercise, which opens the SOEs to private investment, are other incentives
all geared toward that goal. Initially, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Act had put a limit on the percentage of shares that a foreigner might hold
in a Nigerian firm.
This has been relaxed. Subject to a few exceptions
relating to sensitive issues of national security, a foreigner may now wholly
own a Nigerian company."' The 1995 Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission Act (NIPC) has provisions assuring the protection of
investment by foreigners.1 6 According to the NIPC Act, no enterprise
shall be nationalized or expropriated by any Government of the
Federation and no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital
of any enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender their interest, in
the capital, to any other persons. " ' Similarly, the Federal Government
may not acquire an enterprise unless the acquisition is in the national

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Some examples include the World Trade Organization, United Nations,
International Monetary Fund, ICSID, etc.
113. The benefits of foreign direct investment are (i) it provides needed capital to
supplement the host country's savings; (ii) it fills the gaps between the actual amount of
capital and resources generated by government revenue, foreign exchange, and managerial
skills and the planned amount of capital and resources needed to achieve development
targets; (iii) it alleviates the foreign exchange trade gap and fills gaps in projected tax
revenue; and (iv) it results in the transfer or improvement of technology. See Iyayi, supra
note 13, at 63-69. The drawbacks of foreign direct investment are (i) it lowers domestic
savings and investment rates by disrupting competition; (ii) it inhibits growth of indigenous
companies; (iii) it perpetuates uneven development; (iv) it inhibits development in farming;
and (iv) it limits rural to urban migration. See id. at 67-69.
114. Investment Promotion Commission Decree No. 16 (1995) § 17 (Nigeria).
115. Id.
116. Id. at §§ 25 and 26.
117. Id. at § 17.
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interest or for a public purpose under a law which makes provision for (a)
payment of fair and adequate compensation and (b) a right of access to the
courts for the determination of: (i) the investor's interest or right, and (ii)
the amount of compensation to which they are entitled.
Such
compensation shall be paid without undue delay, and authorization will be18
given for its repatriation in convertible currency where applicable.
Aliens may bring money into the country through authorized dealers and
obtain a certificate of capital importation. 19 Such capital is guaranteed
unconditional transferability and repatriation of funds with regard to
earnings and capital. In conjunction with the privatization exercise, these
incentives open Nigeria to foreign investment and, all things being equal,
promote capital inflow to the country.
V.

IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
NIGERIA

The intentions reflected in the privatization program are lofty.
However, the Nigerian experience reveals that the theoretical and legal
frameworks are only a starting point in using privatization to attract
foreign investment. Other important variables must be present before
privatization can have the desired positive effect on foreign investment.
Among these variables are political stability and democracy. As indicated
in Part IV, the military administration in Nigeria first started the
privatization exercise in approximately 1989. In 1990, the exercise resulted
in sixteen million dollars revenue.'20 This increased to $35 million in 1991,
$114 million in 1992, $541 million in 1993, and then declined to $24 million
121
122
in 1994.11 The data for the years 1995 through 1998 are not available.
For those familiar with the political history of Nigeria, one recalls that the
latter years were the height of the military dictatorship and represented a
period during which the country suffered the worst international isolation
due to the repressive regime that ran its affairs. The lesson is that absent a
credible and stable polity, privatization laws and programs are not worth
the paper on which they are written.

118. Id.
119. Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 (1995)
(Nigeria).
120. Privatization
in
Sub-Saharan
Africa:
Region
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.ipanet.net/documentslWorldBank/databases/plink/factsheets/SSA.htm
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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For the exercise, which started in 1999, the jury is still out. However,
the indicators are mixed. It would seem that foreigners are still wary of the
political climate in the country. This is not helped by the various crises,
which the country has witnessed since the inception of civilian
administration in 1999.113 The president has embarked on numerous trips
overseas with the declared purpose of wooing investors. Yet, it would
seem that the latter are still cautious. Recently, the Director General of
the Bureau of Public EnterprisesS 124
lamented that foreign investors were
slow in participating in the exercise.
The privatization exercise is yet to find core investors for three of the

most prominent SOEs.

115

The electricity company NEPA is also embroiled

in controversy. The opposition of its employees to the exercise is sufficient
to discourage any foreign investor. No one would like to use his capital to

acquire a controversy. The Bureau received a bid from a "foreign firm"
for the telephone company, NITEL. Yet, the prospective core investor
could not pay and the Bureau claimed it had forfeited its deposit, which
was actually sourced from a local Nigerian bank. Even though this dispute
is in arbitration, the Bureau has entered into a contract with a firm126 for
the management of NITEL pending its privatization. The Nigerian
Airways issue illustrates the problem of administrative fight for turf. The
supervising Ministry for that SOE and the Bureau are both laying claims to

123. There have been religious crises and tensions regarding the introduction of sharia in
some parts of the country; there have also been ethnic crises in the Niger delta region; and
in 2002, the Miss World beauty pageant, which had commenced in Nigeria, had to be
moved to the United Kingdom where it was completed.
124. Interview with Mr. Nasiru el-Rufai, Director General of the Bureau for Public
Enterprises (BPE) in Lagos, Nigeria published in The President's Rebuke on the Airways
Matter was the Lowest Point in my Career, THE GUARDIAN CONSCIENCE, NURTURED BY
TRUTH,
Apr.
27,
2003,
at
4,
at
http://www.news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/2003/apr/27/0061.html (where the Director
General, Mr. Nasiru el-Rufai stated: "I clearly want to see new monies coming into the
Nigerian economy, which is one of the objectives of the programme. But you see, you
cannot force that, because President Obasanjo has gone on several foreign trips to woo
foreign investors, that has not forced foreign investors to come. So what are you going to
do? Are you going to say because I have no foreign investors I will not do anything?").
125. NEPA, NITEL, and Nigeria Airways have yet to privatize. Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, Guidelines on Privatisation & Commercialisation available at
http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/guide-priv.shtml (last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
126. Levi Anyikwa, Govt Names Dutch Firm as New Managers for NITEL, THE
GUARDIAN,
Jan. 15, 2003, available at http://www.ijawcenter.com/news/newspage0030115.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2005). The new manager, Dutch firm Pentascope
International, but this may not be treated as foreign investment, since the firm is just to
turn NITEL around and perhaps make it more attractive to investors.
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127

the authority to privatize the Nigerian Airways.
One wonders how
foreign investors are to be attracted to such a firm. It is also surprising that
the President and his advisers did not think it proper to resolve the
controversy in time. It continues to fester and does damage to the quest
for foreign investment.
The privatization program enunciated by the 1999 law, the second
piece of legislation on privatization of SOEs, resulted in overall gross
revenue of 60.2 billion naira and an overall net proceed of 58.04 billion
naira at the end of 2002.
This was with the conclusion of the second
phase of an anticipated three-phase exercise. Significantly, of the 43
enterprises privatized under the two phases, none was acquired by a
foreigner or other foreign
• entity.129The nearest was the failed attempt by a
"British" firm to acquire NITEL. That firm lost its deposit when the sale
could not go on and it was discovered that the deposit was actually sourced
locally. Even if the deal had materialized, it would still not have marked a
true foreign investment, because it was a foreign acquisition only in
principle. The sad conclusion is that on the first of the two dimensional
nexus between privatization and foreign investment, that is the direct
injection of foreign capital through direct acquisition by foreigners of the
SOEs, the Nigerian exercise has not had any positive impact. The only
inquiry left is whether the privatization program has indirectly boosted
foreign investment in Nigeria.
This second aspect of the inquiry is hamstrung by the paucity of data
on these investments. The National Investment Promotion Commission is
the agency charged with promoting investments in the country.3 Ideally,
as part of its statutory duties, the Commission should keep record of
foreign investment inflows into the country. Therefore, it should be a
ready and available source of authentic data on foreign investment trends
in Nigeria. Unfortunately, statistics and data upkeep do not seem to be a

127. This factor of lack of cooperation from bureaucrats and politicians is not an
insignificant problem. Ernst & Young warn that: "Between the possibility of war or civil
disorder on the one hand, and heavy-handed government interference on the other, lies the
possibility that local politicians will treat privatization as political football in order to
further their own ends, to the detriment of the investment." ERNST & YOUNG, supra note
15, at 63.
128. Unofficial report from the Bureau of Public Enterprises.
129. BPE is in the process of again putting forward NITEL for sale. Hamisu Muhammad,
BPE to Conclude Sale Next Month, DAILY TRUST (Abuja), Sept 20, 2005 (on file with
author)
130. See Nigerian Investment Promotion Act (1995)
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prime issue for the agency.'
Fortunately, there are other sources and
available records that illustrate, until 1960, over ninety per cent of total
investments in Nigeria were under foreign ownership. 131
With
independence and the nationalism surrounding the new status, local
participation continued to increase. This of course led to a reduction in
the percentage of foreign investments in the country. In 1967, the value of
total cumulative foreign direct investment in Nigeria was 64.2 million
naira.'33 This continued to increase and by 1977, the value was 519.7
million naira. By 1978 it was 323.9 million naira, and by 1981 the inflow
of direct foreign investment in Nigeria was valued at 492.8 million naira.13'
From 1985 - 1995 the annual average of direct foreign investment in
Nigeria was $921 Million. By 1998, the value had increased by 14% to
$1,051 million.136
Ironically, in 1999, which was the year of the
reinvigorated privatization program, there was a reduction with the foreign
direct investment inflow to Nigeria declining by 4.4% to $1,005 million. 137
This decline continued in 2000 when the country received $930 million
worth of foreign investment ,138 a 7.5% decrease in the value received in
1999. 2001 and 2002 saw respective increases of 18.7% and 16%. The
value of foreign direct investment in 2001 was $1,104 million and $1,281
million in 2002.139

The data illustrate that the flow of direct foreign investments into
Nigeria suffered a small decline in 1999, the year the privatization program
was re-launched, and the following year (2000). But in subsequent years
(2001 and 2002), it seemed to improve substantially. It is therefore
arguable that although foreign direct investment in the nature of
acquisition of the privatized firms remained unaffected by the privatization
131. This writer made several attempts to collect such data from the agency but was only
advised that the agency registered 119 foreign companies since 1999 with a total of $586 as
of May 2003; See e-mail from NIPC (on file with author).
132. J. K. ONOH, THE NIGERIAN OIL ECONOMY: FROM PROSPERITY TO GLUT 4 (Palgrave
Macmillan 1983).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 13 (citing the Central Bank of Nigeria, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW
Vol. 6, no. 2, December 1968; vol. 14 no. 1 March 1976; and vol. 17, no. 2, December 1979).
135. THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, MULTINATIONALS, THE STATE, AND CONTROL OF THE
NIGERIAN ECONOMY 262 (Princeton University Press 1987).
136. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, N.Y., U.S. and Geneva,
Switz, 2003, World Investment Report, FDI Policies for Development: National and
International Perspectives, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003ch2-en.pdf
(last visited Dec. 9, 2005)
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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program, the latter has continued to exert a positive impact in the broader
area of general foreign investment in the country.
Critics may charge that the improvement could be owed to the return
of democracy in the country in the same year that the second privatization
program was instituted, and that the increases seen in 2001 and 2002 reflect
a gradual return of international confidence in the Nigerian polity. Such
an assessment may not substantially detract from the influence of the
privatization program. This is because the deregulation contained in the
economic policies of the civilian administration is but one strand in the
overall reform of the political economy of Nigeria. The privatization
program is a concomitant strand, which complements the deregulation
program. In addition, it is a well accepted notion in international
economics that international agencies act as catalysts for foreign
investments. In other words, the attitude of such agencies toward a
particular country provides a barometer on the suitability of investments
therein.
The World Bank, the International Development Agency, the United
Kingdom Department for International Development and the United
States Agency for International Development have actively participated in
the Nigerian privatization program.
They have not only provided
substantial grants for the smooth and efficient implementation of the
program, but have assisted with technical resources and manpower.
Foreign investors are known to track the activities of multilateral agencies
and those of the leading developed countries such as the United States and
the United Kingdom. Such investors allow their investment decisions to
be substantially informed by the activities or attitude of such prominent
agencies, or at the very least take such attitudes into consideration when
deciding whether or not to pursue an investment in a country. It does not
therefore require complicated analysis to conclude that the pronounced
and active support of the World Bank and other agencies toward the
privatization program in Nigeria has been interpreted by investors as a
positive, if tacit, endorsement of the exercise and of the broader economic
climate in the country. Thus, the surge in foreign direct investment in
Nigeria in 2001 and 2002.
Consequently, the answer to the question of whether the privatization
program has had any impact on foreign direct investment in Nigeria is in
the affirmative. It has provided a positive and enabling environment that
is conducive to improved foreign investments in Nigeria, even though such
investments in the privatized enterprises have remained largely unaffected.
Perhaps, one way that foreign interest can be significantly aroused in direct

140. Id.
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acquisition of the SOEs is for the government to reconsider the approach
of partial privatization. Given the controversies inherent in government,
and among departments, foreign investors may not be comfortable with an
arrangement in which they are partners with such disorganized body.
Similarly, the regulatory framework such as competition rules, or
regulations on standards should be introduced or strengthened.
Unfortunately, Nigeria still lacks a competition regime. Although both the
Bureau and the Council are working hard to push an antitrust statute, their
proposed bill is still a draft and is yet to make it to the National Assembly.
This is still the case more than 15 years after the country started the
privatization program. The need for coherent and effective competition
law cannot be overemphasized. It should be at least an adjunct, if not a
precursor to a successful privatization exercise. Had such a regime been in
existence, the initial opposition to the privatization program could have
been substantially softened. Foreign investors are comfortable with a
predictable and stable environment. They are aware that the absence of
clear and tested standards will, in the future, entail a posteriori, ad hoc,
and, ad hominem regulations.
Such retrospective enactment and
application of rules will detract from the assurances contained in the laws
and distort the economy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although privatization is controversial, it is necessary for revamping
the Nigerian economy. The structural and institutional frameworks
established by the Nigerian government for achieving that objective
appear sound. However, those frameworks are only a first step in the long
journey of attracting foreign capital by transferring SOEs into private
hands. The implementation of the arrangement is equally important. If
confidence is lacking, or if it is mired in unnecessary controversy, the lofty
objectives may remain a will-o-the wisp. Also, the factors of social and
political stability are fundamental. The government should act promptly
to resolve outstanding controversies regarding some of the SOEs. In
addition, it should strengthen regulations. Above all, it should improve
the security situation in the country. These are vital if the privatization
program is to have the desired goal of attracting foreign investments into
the country.
/ •• With
.
.• the
141 transition of the civilian administration to another
such administration in 2003, it is hoped that the international community
will now banish every misgiving about politics in Nigeria. Finally, the most

141. Some critics, however, charge that the transition was fraught with electoral fraud and
that the ruling party is on the verge of making Nigeria a de facto one party state.
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populous country in Africa is ready, able, and willing to take its position in
the comity of free and stable nations. This should give foreigners
additional assurance on the viability, durability, and profitability of
investments in Nigeria.

